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Non-technical Summary
Knowledge about the levels of comparative tax burdens of companies is important for political debate in
many ways since the tax burden decides whether companies have competitive advantages or disadvantages
in relation to their foreign competitors. Furthermore, structures and levels of taxation play an important role
in the realisation of the European Union, as recent discussions about the Code of Conduct of the European
Commission and similar steps of the OECD against harmful tax competition show.
During the past years, also in response to the growing demand by policy makers, various measures to
compute and to compare tax burdens of companies have been developed. However, the accuracy of the
results of tax burden comparisons differs depending on how detailed an analysis is and which provisions of
the tax codes are included.
Therefore, in the first part, this paper reviews the most common approaches used to measure tax burdens
of companies. In addition, we present a computer-based model (so-called European Tax Analyzer) for the
international computation and comparison of company tax burdens. The methodology follows the forward-
looking concepts for the measurement of effective average tax rates (EATR) on the basis of a model-firm.
In contrast to the prevailing approaches for calculating EATR our model-firm approach allows to calculate
EATR for more complex and realistic conditions that are relevant for the decision making. Due to its flexi-
bility another important advantage of the model-firm approach is the possibility to include the most relevant
and complex provisions of the tax codes (i.e. tax systems, taxes, tax rates, and tax bases).
A concrete comparison of the EATR of corporations and their shareholders in five different countries is
carried out in the second part of this paper. This comparison as well as various sensitivity analysis for al-
ternative assumptions of both economic and tax data reveal not only the areas of application of our Euro-
pean Tax Analyzer but also the wide spread between the EATR in the countries covered by this study.
Based on the comparison of the EATR between Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands, and the USA
the following main conclusions are possible:
- If one can take a medium-sized manufacturing company as typical, the EATR both for corporations and
shareholders is highest in France.
- This conclusion, however, cannot be generally applied to every situation as there are many options and
planning opportunities which can increase or decrease the EATR in the countries. As examples, the ef-
fects of tax electives and the tax base as a whole, as well as the effects of alternative assumptions con-
cerning relevant economic data like profitability, financing and dividend policy etc. have been shown.
- The differences between the national EATR are related to the individual characteristics of the national
tax systems. The model of the European Tax Analyzer enables to show the user the impact of the cor-
porate tax system, the various profit and non-profit taxes, the tax bases and the tax rates on the EATR.
It could be worked out that the profit taxes, corporation tax systems and tax rates have the highest im-
pact on these differences. Nevertheless, the impact of the tax bases on the EATR cannot be neglected.
- For the time series 1995-2000 it could be shown that the differences between the national EATR have
declined a little. In spite of this convergence, however, tax distortions of competition did not become
significantly less.
In summary, we believe that the European Tax Analyzer is a new important instrument for computing and
analyzing the EATR for many complex economic situations taking into account the most relevant provisions
of the national tax codes.
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11 Introduction
With the formal establishment of the Single Market in 1992 and the third stage of the European Money
Union in 1999 (EMU) many regulatory and economic barriers in the European Union (EU) have been re-
moved. Yet, competition in the EU is still strongly distorted by the tax regimes of the Member States. Thus
taxation has become an important remaining factor which prevents the full realization of the Common Mar-
ket and its four fundamental freedoms. It is therefore not surprising that discussions on the economics of
one business location as against another in Europe usually quickly turn to the comparative tax burdens.
In 1992, the Ruding Committee found out, that taxation differences between the Member States may dis-
tort competition in the EU. These differences result from the specific national tax systems, taxes, tax bases
and rates.1 In its 1992 Communication the European Commission rejected most of the Ruding Commit-
tee’s recommendations as it could not clearly be shown to what extent the distortions were related to one
of these four factors. Moreover, the Commission referred to the political problems to harmonize direct
taxes in the EU (unanimity, Art. 93, 95 EU-Treaty). Instead the Commission,2 in line with politicians,3
quoted subsidiarity as the basic principle for the harmonization of direct taxes in Europe. As a result, the
process of harmonization came to a standstill.
It took more than four years before the necessity of a co-ordinated tax policy, in order to promote the
proper functioning of the Single Market, the run-up to the third stage of the EMU and Member States’
competitiveness and employment, was recognized in official statements.4 Another important and major step
in the area of business taxation is one of the two components of the tax package agreed upon in December
1997: the code of conduct.5 This code aims at fighting against unfair and harmful tax competition. Although
there exists no clear definition of unfair tax competition (which is admittedly a difficult task), what is meant
in principle is a reduction of the tax rates or tax bases in one country with the aim to attract more direct
investment and other transactions from companies located in other countries. The fight against harmful tax
competition calls for co-operation between the Member States and commentaries suggest the approval of
a minimum standard framework (i.e. rates and bases) for the taxation of companies (and not an overall
harmonization).6
Both for the assessment of the distorting effects of tax competition and the proper definition of minimum tax
standards it is first of all necessary to have an idea about the level of the tax burden of companies in the
EU, as well as of the structural and systematic distortions of competition related to tax differentials. In par-
ticular, it is necessary to show separately the effects of the tax systems, taxes, tax bases and rates on these
differentials. In order to measure the effective tax burden and to assess the impact of taxation on managerial
decisions such as location, investment, and financing, various methodological approaches have been devel-
oped. However, there is an ongoing discussion about the appropriate concept.
                                                
1 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1992a).
2 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1992b).
3 See recently HENDRICKS (1999), p. 96.
4 The main challenges to be solved by a more co-ordinated approach in taxation policy are (1) stabilization of Member
States’ tax revenues, (2) smooth functioning of the Single Market, and (3) promoting employment. See COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1996), p. 94-98; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1997), p. 23-30;
HINNEKENS (1996), p. 91-93.
5 See Official Journal C2, 6 January 1998, p- 1-6. See also MONTI (1998), p. 2-3. The OECD also launched a debate on
this issue. See OECD (1998). See PINTO (1998), p. 386-410, OSTERWEIL (1999), p. 198-202, for a comparison of the two
approaches.
6 See RUDING (1998), p. 72-73; VANISTENDAEL (1999), p. 2-3.
2Referring to these aspects this paper has several aims. In a first step the most relevant methodical ap-
proaches for international tax burden comparisons are evaluated to which extent their results are good indi-
cators for the effective tax burden and its impact on managerial decisions (chapter 2). Afterwards, we in-
troduce our own approach for the calculation of effective average tax rates, based on the concept of a
model-firm. In order to demonstrate the efficiency and the possibilities of this approach, with respect to the
measuring and analyzing of effective tax burdens, the tax burdens in four EU-member states and the USA
are also calculated and compared applying various sensitivity analysis (chapter 3). The last chapter is a
summary of the conclusions (chapter 4).
2 Evaluation of existing approaches for international tax burden comparisons
2.1 Methodical requirements
If an international tax burden comparison is to have any meaning at all, it must at least heed to the following
considerations:7
- Relevant taxes: In order to compute the effective tax burden the comparison must include all taxes that
have an impact on the profitability of an investment and must take not only the tax rates, but also the
characteristics of the national tax systems into account. Thus, the comparison must include all profit and
non-profit taxes levied on the investment as well as the interrelation between these taxes.
- Relevant tax bases: The tax burden is calculated by multiplying the tax rate and the tax base. A com-
prehensive comparison therefore has to include the most relevant provisions for the bases of assessment
affected by the investments whose tax burden are analysed. Thus, it is the scope of the considered in-
vestments that determines the relevant provisions for the tax bases to be covered. A valid comparison
should include at least the provisions that are generally available for a single investment (e.g. deprecia-
tion, capital gains taxation), a group of related investments or a multi-period production (e.g. calculation
of production costs, stock valuation) as well as for the whole company (e.g. provisions for bad debts).
- Loss compensation: If the periodical result of an investment is negative not all expenses and deductions
in accounting result in an immediate tax saving in that period. In such a situation the amount of tax saving
rather depends on the rules for loss compensation. As these rules influence the tax burden for different
types of investment and also differ materially among countries they have to be included in a valid com-
parison.
- Relevant taxpayers: Structural differences between national tax systems are mainly caused by the cor-
poration tax systems and the interaction of corporation and income tax respectively. Among the Mem-
ber States we can find the classical system, double taxation mitigating (e.g. shareholder relief) and dou-
ble taxation avoiding systems (e.g. imputation systems).8 For this reason tax burdens not only for re-
tained but also for distributed profits differ among nations. In order to consider these facts in interna-
tional tax burden comparisons besides the taxation at the companies’ level the taxation at the level of the
shareholders has also to be examined. In this connection the taxation of distributed profits and of other
income related to the company are of main interest (e.g. taxation of interest from shareholders’ loans).
- Calculation period: Most of the differences between tax burdens related to the bases of assessment
and various tax electives are only temporary (e.g. depreciation and accounting for provisions). A valid
and useful determination of the resulting financial effects (interest and liquidity) is only possible over a
multi-year-period.
                                                
7 For a more detailed discussion see SPENGEL (1995), p. 5-18.
8 See CNOSSEN (1993), JACOBS (1999), p. 265-268, for an overview of different types of corporation tax systems.
3- Model comparisons with identical pre-tax data: Many factors such as the sources of finance, the
types of business assets, the sales and the costs - in short, the entire business policy - will be dictated by
circumstances and opportunities specific to the country or market. On the one hand, in reality, many of
these factors are often influenced by taxation considerations.9 However, on the other hand, considering
real economic data does not allow to calculate and isolate tax related distortions of competition. There-
fore effective tax burdens can only be computed on the basis of a model. This requires the assumption
of an identical starting point and identical pre-tax data for the alternative projects that are compared.10
- Financial consequences of taxation: The measures for effective tax burdens should help to assess the
impact of taxation on managerial decisions (e.g. location, investment, financing and distribution). This
problem cannot be solved by referring the tax payments to figures such as taxable or accounting profits
because they are defined legally and therefore not interrelated with economic decisions. Moreover, they
are not defined uniformly in different countries which means that the tax burdens cannot be compared at
all even if the computed tax payments were the same. Instead it is necessary to relate the tax burden to
relevant financial pre-tax figures such as financial profit, cash flow, return on equity or net assets. In or-
der to assess the incentive effects set by taxation, the calculations must be based on future and not on
past financial data or profits.11
2.2 Statutory tax rate
Practitioners and industrial unions12 often measure the tax burden by the statutory or nominal tax rate.
Statutory tax rates are easy to calculate as they only take into account the cumulative marginal tax rates of
the (profit and non-profit) taxes levied considering their interdependencies.13 Although they have an impor-
tant signal function and also may be relevant for the decision of where to locate international mobile activi-
ties14 statutory tax rates are not at all useful estimates for the tax burden of real (productive) investment as
the effects of the tax bases are omitted. Also tax rate reductions, loss compensation and other tax benefits
are not considered. As a result, the tax burden thus determined is very inexact and considerably overesti-
mates the amount of the effective tax burden.
2.3 Backward-looking concepts
A common approach to measure the effective tax burden in policy-making is aggregated tax rates of exist-
ing firms. As these tax measures refer to the capital stock, profits or other relevant data accumulated in the
past they are called backward-looking approaches.15 Within this framework one can distinguish between
approaches based on firm-specific data or on aggregated economic data.
                                                
9 See BOND, DEVEREUX , GAMMIE (1996), p. 109-112.
10 See AUERBACH (1990), p. 326; KING, FULLERTON (1984), p. 281; OECD (1991), p. 94-95.
11 See KING, FULLERTON (1984), p. 7-12; OECD (1999), p. 4; SCHNEIDER (1994), p. 541; SCHREIBER, KÜNNE (1996), p. 47.
12 So in Germany BUNDESVERBAND DER DEUTSCHEN INDUSTRIE/VERBAND DER CHEMISCHEN INDUSTRIE (1999), p. 6-
7.
13 For example, for German corporations the statutory tax rate for retained profits amounts to 52.35 p.c. which is com-
posed of corporate income tax, solidarity levy and trade tax.
14 E.g. financing structures, administration, coordination and distribution centres, European Headquaters. See DE-
VEREUX (1992), p. 105-117 for empirical evidence.
15 We refer to the terminology of the OECD. See OECD (1999). In the earlier literature regardless of the forward-looking
concepts to be discussed in section 2.4 only these backward-looking concepts were identified as measures for aver-
age effective tax rates. See FULLERTON (1984), p. 23-41.
4Firm-specific data: Approaches based on firm-specific data express the effective tax burden as a per-
centage of the tax liabilities relative to the profits from annual accounts. Data can either be taken from indi-
vidual financial statements or consolidated returns. Although such measures cover the most relevant aspects
of the tax systems, taxes, tax bases and rates for current and past regulations, a reliable measurement of the
effective tax burden is not possible. One reason is the complete omission of the taxation of shareholders.
Other reasons refer to data problems in the case of foreign source income. If individual financial state-
ments16 are used and the country in which the corporation is located either exempts foreign source income
from taxation (e.g. Germany, France, the Netherlands) or grants a tax credit for foreign taxes (e.g. Greece,
Ireland, Spain, the UK), there is a mismatch between the numerator and the denominator as the companies
profits include foreign source income while only domestic tax (after deducting foreign taxes in the case of a
tax credit) is included in the numerator. Therefore, the measured tax burden tends to be too low. If instead
the calculations are based on data from consolidated returns17 there is no such mismatch between the nu-
merator (world wide tax liability) and the denominator (world wide profits). However, one has to bear in
mind that the tax burden which is measured in this case does not refer to the domestic taxes only but rather
the world wide tax burden including foreign taxes on the world wide activities. Therefore, these tax ratios
are very misleading if they are used to assess and compare the effective domestic tax burden in international
studies. Altogether, tax ratios based on firm-specific data can be a robust indicator for the tax burden of
corporations or groups of companies. But, referring to the above mentioned problems, an international
comparison of domestic tax burdens is hardly possible.18 Moreover, as the calculations are based on past
data they merely say nothing about the investment incentives of the tax system or future tax reforms.
Aggregate economic data: Measures for the tax burden using aggregate economic data from national
accounts include domestic corporate taxes (in general only corporate income taxes) in the numerator and in
the denominator various income measures such as
- aggregate domestic corporate profits,
- corporate operating surplus (i.e. value added accruing to factor capital)19 or
- gross domestic product.20
Although these formulas are mathematically correct, the use of aggregate economic data from national ac-
counts is problematic and misleading for several reasons. Referring to aggregate domestic corporate
profits one has to bear in mind that many countries do not report separately on corporate profits. In Ger-
many, for example, the only available profit figures include data for the unincorporated sector such as reve-
nues from sole traders and partnerships,21 aggriculture and forestry, and also revenues from tax exempt
institutions such as the German Federal Reserve Bank. Moreover, referring to the corporate operating
surplus, interest, rent and royalties paid by corporations enter in the denominator. However, taxes on the-
ses sources of income are paid by private savers which do not enter in the numerator at all. The use of such
tax ratios is also questionable for other reasons: the aggregate tax ratio is a static concept, and the tax reve-
nues considered in its calculation and the profits from corporate activities according to the national accounts
do not stem from the same year. Instead, they are the cash tax receipts which have been reduced by loss
                                                
16 See JACOBS, SPENGEL (1997b).
17 See MAASTRICHT ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING RESEARCH AND EDUCATION CENTER (1999).
18 These tax ratios might, however, be a reliable instrument for cross-sectoral comparisons and empirical studies.
19 See MENDOZA, RAZIN , TESAR (1994).
20 See OECD (1997).
21 In Germany, for example, about 90 p.c. of all enterprises have the legal form of sole traders and partnerships. See the
periodical publications of the German Federal Statistical Office.
5carryforwards and carrybacks, whereas these loss treatments do not affect companies profits from national
accounts.
In summary, comparably low tax revenues in the numerator might oppose a very substantial profit figure in
the denominator which explains the downward bias derived by these measures for several countries in-
cluding Germany.22 Due to this mismatch between numerator and denominator, the use of aggregate eco-
nomic data is a very unreliable concept for both measuring business tax burdens23 and providing informa-
tion about the incentives of a tax system to stimulate new investment. Even if these statistical problems of
the proper assignment of taxes to profits did not exist, an international comparison of tax ratios thus deter-
mined would be problematic as the methods and definitions of the national accounting systems differ be-
tween the countries.
2.4 Forward-looking concepts
In contrast to the tax measures described above, forward looking approaches calculate the effective tax
burden for a hypothetical future investment project or company over the assumed life of the project. We
can therefore distinguish between effective marginal and effective average tax measures.
2.4.1 Effective marginal tax rates (EMTR)
The calculation of effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) closely follows the commonly used model of King
and Fullerton.24 As this approach was applied and fully described in many international studies25 it will only
be broadly outlined here. The EMTR measures the extra tax of a marginal investment project and is defined
as the difference between the pre-tax and the post-tax return of this project divided by the pre-tax return.
Marginal investments are new additional projects yielding a rate of return on the initially invested capital
(equal to the last unit invested) that is just sufficient to that the project is from the investor’s point of view
worthwhile. Therefore, the calculations are based on the assumption of a capital market equilibrium and an
optimal investment behaviour where the marginal benefits just equal the marginal costs (i.e. the project gen-
erates no rents above the market interest rate (= no economic rents or pure profits). The EMTR can be
measured for the corporation alone or also taking into account the shareholder level.
In terms of the calculations, the most relevant tax provisions are to be considered such as all relevant profit
and non-profit taxes and the statutory tax rates. However, only a few items of the tax base enter the calcu-
lations (especially rules for depreciation, valuation of inventories and investment incentives) as the structure
of the investment is very simple. At the shareholder level the corporation and income tax systems as well as
capital gains and property taxes are taken into account. As company taxation differs from the industry, the
assets, the financing and the tax status of the saver, the EMTR depends upon the portion of the marginal
investment in each type of asset and the portion of the company finance in each source of finance. The
model can include as assets intangibles, buildings, machinery, inventories and financial assets. The consid-
ered sources of finance are new equity capital, profit retention and debt financing. Savers can be individual
shareholders, parent companies, financial intermediaries or tax exempt institutions. The EMTR for a whole
industry is a weighted average of separate EMTR characterized by a particular combination of assets, fi-
nancing and savers.
                                                
22 See SPENGEL, ECKERLE (1999), p. 2, for an overview of results.
23 See OECD (1999), p. 13; BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER FINANZEN (German Ministry of Finance) (1999), p. 13-14.
24 See KING, FULLERTON (1984).
25 See, for example, BOVENBERG ET. AL. (1990), CARON & STEVENS/  BAKER & MCKENZIE (1999); CHENNELLS,
GRIFFITH (1997); CLAASSEN (1994); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1992a); OECD (1991).
6The EMTR approach fulfils the principal methodological requirements for international tax burden compari-
sons. Although the calculations of EMTR are based on a simple model of a firm with strict assumptions
about the market, investment and financing conditions that are not representative (e.g. rates of return, inter-
est rate, inflation) and omit various tax provisions concerning the tax base,26 the approach is of high interna-
tional acceptance and was also considered for a long time as the only forward-looking concept providing
information of the tax driven investment incentives.27
2.4.2 Effective average tax rates (EATR)
In contrast to the EMTR, the effective average tax rate (EATR) measures the effective tax burden of proj-
ects that earn more than the capital costs (i.e. projects generating economic rents). In principle, the EATR
for a future investment project is calculated as the ratio of the future tax liabilities divided by the pre-tax
financial profit or some other parameter for the value of the firm over the estimated period of life of that
project. The EATR can be expressed as the relation of the present value of the corporate tax payments
and the pre-tax financial profits.28 An equivalent expression of the EATR would be the difference between
the pre-tax and the post-tax return of the project divided by the pre-tax return.29 The EATR like the
EMTR can account for the corporate taxes alone or also consider the taxation at the shareholder level.
To show the differences between the effective marginal and the effective average tax burden, the calculation
of EATR must differ from the measurement of EMTR with respect to the conceptual framework of the
model and the coverage of tax provisions.30
- Conceptual framework of the model: In contrast to the EMTR approach models for the calculation of
EATR do not need to characterize optimal investment behaviour based on the restrictive assumptions of
a general equilibrium of the market conditions, because the tax effects on infra-marginal investments (i.e.
investments in imperfect market conditions) are in the centre of interest. Moreover, instead of only new
investment the taxation of an already existing capital stock should be analyzed.
- Coverage of tax provisions: Effective average tax rate measures like the EMTR account for all rele-
vant taxes (corporate, personal and non-profit taxes), statutory tax rates and the rules for profit com-
putation. However, there are several tax provisions such as progressive tax rates, tax rates with income
brackets, tax exempt amounts, minimum and maximum tax provisions, (investment) tax credit with upper
ceiling, and limitations for loss compensation that can explain differences between the marginal and the
average tax burden and therefore have to be included in a model for the calculation of EATR.
EATR can be calculated for separate investment projects based on the King-Fullerton-model31 or for a
complex model of a hypothetical firm using specified weights for the assets, sources of finance etc.32
                                                
26 See BRADFORD, STUART  (1986), p. 308-311, for a critical review.
27 See FULLERTON (1986), p. 291; SCHNEIDER (1992), p. 418.
28 See OECD (1999), p. 8.
29 See DEVEREUX, GRIFFITH (1999), p. 6.
30 See also FULLERTON (1984), p. 28-29, for reasons why EMTR and EATR differ. Although FULLERTON only refers to
backward-looking concepts for EATR many of the arguments also hold for forward-looking concepts.
31 See DEVEREUX, GRIFFITH (1999), p. 5.
32 The model described below is based on a model-firm approach for computing EATR. See section 3.1.
72.5 Summary and comparison
The comparison of the alternative approaches to measure corporate tax burdens has dealt with various
concepts. However, the relevance of theses approaches for the calculation of the effective tax burden and
for the assessment of the impact of current (and in the case of a reform future) tax systems on investment
behaviour is different. It has been worked out that the best indicators for analyzing the impact of taxation on
investment behaviour are forward-looking concepts such as the effective marginal (EMTR) and the effec-
tive average tax rate (EATR). The questions arises which one of the two approaches - EMTR or EATR -
is an appropriate concept.
The EMTR is based on the assumption that all investment projects will be realized that earn the cost of
capital. Therefore, EMTR indicate whether a tax system or a change in the tax laws sets incentives to make
additional investments or not. As the EMTR are calculated for different assets and financing policies, they
are used to measure intersectoral distortions exclusively attributable to taxation.33
In reality, however, for a number of circumstances, the impact of taxation on investment decisions cannot
be measured by the King-Fullerton-approach alone. The reason for this is that in reality only investments
with a rate of return above their capital costs are realized. As these projects generate an economic rent,
investment pattern and managerial decisions respectively might be affected by the taxation of pure profits.
Hence, what is relevant for the investment decision is the average (i.e. total) tax levied on the total return
(including pure profits) of the project, or, in other words the post-tax profits. Therefore, if the investor has
the choice between two or more mutually exclusive projects all of them expecting to generate economic
rents, the EATR is the relevant tax burden. Examples for such investment choices given in the literature are
alternative (international) production location, production technologies, production types and qualities, and
investments in the case of financial constraints.34
In summary, there exists no general forward-looking effective tax rate concept for the purpose of tax com-
petition. It rather depends on the kind of investment choice or the objective of the measurement whether
the EMTR or the EATR is the more suitable concept:35 On the one hand, if one aims to assess the alloca-
tion efficiency of a tax system, the EMTR is the approach to use. On the other hand, if the aim of the tax
burden comparison is to measure the impact of taxation on managerial decisions (i.e. for imperfect market
conditions) the EATR is the relevant approach. These findings might be relevant for practical policy ques-
tions. If we refer to the location of new production plants and the incentives for additional investments as
examples, one has to distinguish:36 Whereas the choice of the location or production plant and, thus, the
attractiveness of a country for foreign investors rather depends on the EATR, it depends on the EMTR
whether there are incentives for additional investments after choosing the place of location.
However, as the results both for the EMTR and the EATR are derived from models, the measured impact
of taxation is only valid under the assumptions of these models. As assumptions of a model can never be
fully representative, the impact of taxation on investment cannot be measured by these models alone. In
addition, survey based information or empirical data has to be used.
                                                
33 See, for example, FULLERTON  (1984), p. 24, 30.
34 See DEVEREUX (1995), p. 183-184; DEVEREUX, GRIFFITH (1998); DEVEREUX, GRIFFITH (1999), p. 10-13.
35 See SPENGEL (1996), p. 48-52.
36 See RICHTER, SEITZ, WIEGARD (1996), p. 19.
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3.1 Methodological concept of the European Tax Analyzer
3.1.1 Conceptual framework
In contrast to the King-Fullerton-approach for the computation of EMTR there is no generally accepted
approach for the computation of the EATR. So far, only very few models seem to exist. Referring to the
market conditions and investment choices mentioned above for which the EATR turns out to be the rele-
vant concept, we think that a suitable approach should model the circumstances that are relevant for the
decision making in the most realistic way. Therefore, we believe that a model-firm approach turns out to be
better than tax considerations for single investments that are aggregated for the total firm afterwards. If the
latter approach is based on the methodology of King / Fullerton,37 then the EATR for a company is calcu-
lated as the weighted average of a particular combinations of assets, financing, and savers. The conceptual
framework of a model-firm approach is, however, completely different.38 The calculations are already
based on a industry-specific mix of assets and liabilities. Based on this (in general existing) capital stock, the
future pre-tax profits are derived on the basis of estimates for the future cash receipts and cash expenses
associated with the initial capital stock. In order to determine the post-tax profits the tax liabilities are de-
rived by taking into account the tax bases according to the national rules and then applying the national tax
rates. As such model-firms, if computer based, can easily be run under alternative sets of assumptions on
key variables such as pre-tax receipts and expenses, types and age of assets, sources of finance etc., they
may provide reliable results (i.e. EATR) for different circumstances and even different industries.
Model-firms are of high practical relevance as the calculations are based on the firms’ total cash receipts
and expenses (i.e. cash flows), assets and liabilities. As far as we know, in the process of managers’ deci-
sion making the overall returns, cash-flows and other ratios for profitability and liquidity are more relevant
than the figures that are related to separate investments.39 Besides the correct calculation of tax payments
and effective tax burdens the use of cash flows, therefore, makes it possible to demonstrate simultaneously
the impact of taxation on the pre-tax return and other relevant figures for managerial decisions such as the
cash flow, the value of the firm, the total equity, the retained earnings etc. From the results of empirical
studies it is evident that in particular the cash flows and the equity capital of a firm (due to financial con-
straints) may serve as good indicators for explaining the impact of tax systems and changes in tax laws on
investment behaviour.40
Besides this more suitable framework for the modelling of imperfect market conditions and, hence, the
conditions for yielding economic rents, one of the main advantages of a model-firm approach is that this
concept can cover all relevant tax provisions. In contrast to the model-firm concept, the aggregation of
separate independent investment projects in other methodological approaches requires an algebraic ex-
pression of the tax code for the tax computations.41 This algebraic expression, however, cannot be de-
signed to account for many relevant tax provisions and their complexities that affect the total or average tax
burden.
                                                
37 See DEVEREUX, GRIFFITH (1999).
38 See JACOBS, SMITH (1991), p. 148-149.
39 In reality, as there is only a firm-specific structure of assets and liabilities, it is impossible to allocate one source of
finance to one single asset or investment. This might be relevant for modelling financial constraints.
40 See CUMMINS, HASSETT, HUBBARD (1996).
41 See, for example, the EATR model of  DEVEREUX, GRIFFITH (1999).
9Referring to literature,42 the critical disadvantage of the model-firm approach is that the results are heavily
dependent on the particular characteristics of the company. To increase the relevance of the study, how-
ever, such models are able to take into account different economic situations or planning options as profit-
ability, capitalization or dividend policies, to take but three examples. If the options are chosen carefully,
„what-if“ analysis methods can then be used to quantify their impact on the tax burden. The technique of
sensitivity analysis is used in all important studies on international tax burden comparisons regardless of the
methodical approach and the underlying model.43 Therefore, the use of firm data is no specific disadvantage
of the model-firm approach.
The concept described in this section follows this model-firm approach. The so-called European Tax
Analyzer,44 which was developed in a joint research project by the Centre for European Economic Re-
search (ZEW) and the University of Mannheim, is a computer program for calculating and comparing ef-
fective average tax burdens for companies located in different countries.45 The current version covers Ger-
many, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States of America. As the model firm
is designed as a corporation, the tax burden can be calculated for the level of the corporation as well as for
the level of the shareholders.
3.1.2 Input data
3.1.2.1 Non-tax data
The effective average tax burden is derived by simulating the development of a corporation over a ten year
period. For the computation of the tax burden the model uses as inputs economic data of the corporation
and the shareholders as well as tax data.
The development of the corporation is based on the initial capital stock and the data of the corporate plans
that contain variable estimates for the future development of the capital stock.
- Initial capital stock: The capital stock in the first period includes the firm’s total assets and liabilities
that either can be new or already existing. The assets consist of ground and both office and production
buildings, plant and machinery, office furnishing, fixtures, intangibles (patents and royalties), financial as-
sets, participations in other corporations (both domestic and foreign), inventories, trade debtors, cash
funds, and deposits. The liabilities include new equity capital, long-term and short term debt, and trade
creditors.
- Development of capital stock: The corporate planning supplies data about the expected develop-
ment of the capital stock over the simulation period of ten years. The estimates are based on periodical
assumptions for production and sales, acquisition of goods, staff expenditure (e.g. number of employ-
ees, wage per employee and pension costs), other receipts and expenses (e.g. R&D-expenses), invest-
ment, distribution, and costs of financing. It is assumed that in each period the corporation produces
goods which are either inventoried or sold on the market. Therefore, multi-period production is possi-
                                                
42 See, for example, OECD (1999), p. 6.
43 For the calculation of EMTR see KING, FULLERTON (1984), p. 268; CLAASSEN (1994), p. 145. For the calculation of
EATR see DEVEREUX, GRIFFITH (1999), p. 30-37.
44 For detailed descriptions of the model and the computer-software see SPENGEL (1995); JACOBS, SPENGEL (1996);
MEYER (1996). The model also covers the following aspects not mentioned in this paper: Social security contribu-
tions (see SPENGEL (1997)), green taxes (see JACOBS, SPENGEL, WÜNSCHE (1999), p. 7-22), and concepts of neutral
profit taxes (see JACOBS, SCHMIDT  (1997)).
45 The OECD classifies the European Tax Analyzer as a backward-looking (and not a forward-looking) concept for the
calculation of EATR (See OECD (1999), p. 6). This subsumption under the above mentioned concepts is wrong.
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ble. Additional variable assumptions are made with regard to the production costs for material and la-
bour. It is assumed further that depreciable assets (i.e. buildings, plant and machinery, office furnishing,
fixtures, and intangibles) are worn out at the end of their expected economic life. On option, fixed assets
can also be sold for their market value before the end of expected economic life. In any of the two
cases, reinvestments in new assets are made at that time based on the historical costs of the assets ad-
justed for inflation. With regard to investment the assumptions ensure that the initial capital stock at least
remains constant. The assumption allow, however, additional new investment resulting in an increasing
capital stock during the simulation period. In addition to differing rates of price increases, other macro-
economic data considered are credit and debit interest rates, exchange rates for the given countries and
costs for energy and electricity.
- Financing of the corporation: The initial capital stock contains new equity as well as both long and
short term debt capital. As the corporate plans, inter alia, make assumptions about the distribution pol-
icy, in addition to new equity and debt financing the company can be financed by retained earnings (e.g.
the distribution rate is below 100 p.c.).
Due to differences between the corporation tax systems as well as the taxation of capital income (e.g. divi-
dends, interest, and capital gains) in the hands of the shareholders a valid comparison of the tax burdens
has to include the shareholders. The model allows to include up to 10 groups of shareholders with different
shareholding (e.g. participation rate) and personal status. The latter distinguishes between natural and legal
persons, domestic or foreign shareholders, taxable or tax-exempt entities, and other aspects (e.g. family
status, number of children). According to the financing of the corporation the shareholders receive divi-
dends from new equity, interest from loans in the corporation or capital gains upon the disposal of shares in
the case of profit retention. In addition to this income, the underlying assets (e.g. shares and loans) are con-
sidered for non-profit taxes.
3.1.2.2 Tax data
The tax liabilities in the different countries are derived from assessment over the period of ten years under
the rule of each country. This assessment takes into account all relevant taxes that may be influenced by the
investments and financing both at the level of the corporation and the level of the shareholders (see table 1).
Table 1: Considered taxes
Company Shareholder
GER Grundsteuer (real property tax)
Gewerbeertragsteuer (trade tax on profits)
Körperschaftsteuer (corporation tax)
Solidaritätszschlag (solidarity levy)
Einkommensteuer (income tax)
Solidaritätszuchlag (solidarity levy)
Kirchensteuer (church tax)
FRA Taxe foncière (real property tax)
Taxe professionnelle (trade tax)
Taxes assises sur les salaires
(employer's contributions)
Impôt sur les sociétés (corporation tax)
Impôt sur le revenue (income tax)
Prélèvements fiscaux (surcharges on in-
come tax)
Impôt de solidarité sur la fortune (property
tax)
UK Rates
Corporation tax
Income tax
NL Vennootschapsbelasting (corporation tax)
Onroerendbelasting (real property tax)
Inkomstenbelasting (income tax)
Vermogensbelasting (property tax)
USA Property tax
Franchise tax on corporate income
Accumulated earnings tax
Corporate income tax
Income tax
Property tax
11
Referring to the tax bases, the most relevant items with regard to the assets and liabilities included in the
capital stock and the effects of the corporate planning are considered. Furthermore, the tax module of the
model allows to choose several accounting options (tax electives) enabling a company to influence its tax-
able profits. The rules for profit computation cover
- depreciation (methods and tax periods for all considered assets, extraordinary depreciation),
- inventory (stock) valuation (production costs, lifo, fifo and weighted average, inflation reserves),
- development costs (immediate expensing or capitalization),
- taxation capital gains (roll-over relief, inflation adjustment, special tax rates),
- employee pension schemes (deductibility of pension costs, contributions to pension funds, book re-
serves),
- provisions for bad debts,
- elimination and mitigation of double taxation on foreign source income (exemption, foreign tax credit,
deduction of foreign taxes),
- and loss relief.
Finally, in addition to generally available provisions the model can also consider special incentives schemes
granted by the national authorities for the stimulation of new investment as well as research and develop-
ment (special capital allowances, investment and R&D-tax credits, and grants).
Referring to the tax rates, the calculations consider statutory linear as well as progressive tax rate struc-
tures. In the case of progressive rates or income brackets the tax rates enter in the model as functions of
the relevant income or net assets (non-profit taxes) as provided by the tax laws.
3.1.3 Calculation of the effective average tax rate
For the sake of comparability and in order to isolate the effects of taxation it has to be assumed that the
model-firm in each country shows identical data before any taxation.46 Due to this necessary assumption
any differences between pre- and post-tax data in the model can be solely attributed to taxation in the dif-
ferent countries.
The tax burden is expressed in two ways: The absolute effective average tax burden in currency units is
the difference between the pre-tax and the post tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period (i.e.
period 10). An equivalent expression of the effective average tax burden is the effective average tax rate
(EATR). The EATR is the difference between the pre-tax and the post-tax return of the equity capital in-
vested in the corporation divided by the pre-tax return. These returns are derived from the value of the
firm. The effective average tax burden is calculated separately for level of the corporation and the level of
the shareholders (if their taxation is included). The computation of total tax burdens and the EATR takes
four steps.
In a first step the pre-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period is calculated. The pre-tax
value of the firm is derived on the basis of the estimated cash flows and the value of the net assets at the
end of the simulation period. The cash flows are derived on the basis of estimates in the corporate planing
for the cash receipts (sales and other receipts, gains upon the disposal of assets, interest and dividend in-
come) and expenses (wages and pension payments, expenses for material, energy consumption and other
expenses, new investment, interest expenses and distributed profits). The cash flow (= liquidity) is calcu-
lated in each period. Thereby it is assumed that any given amount of surplus cash flow at the end of a single
period can be invested at a given interest rate and any given deficit can by covered by borrowing money at
                                                
46 See section 2.1 above.
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a given debit rate (balancing investment or credit). The interest receipts or expenses plus the amount of the
underlying balancing investments or credits are considered for the calculation of the cash flow in the fol-
lowing period. The value of the net assets at the end of the simulation period is computed by deducting the
liabilities of the corporation (and, if relevant, of the shareholders) from the assets. Both the assets and the
liabilities are valued at calibrated parameters that are the same in each country. For the assets we take their
replacement prices and for the liabilities their nominal values.
pre-tax cash flow at the end of the simulation period (companies’ or overall level)
+ value of the net assets at the end of the simulation period (companies’ or overall level)
(= assets in the capital stock at replacement prices - liabilities in the capital stock at nominal values)
= pre-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period (companies’ or overall level)
In a second step the post-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period is calculated. The deter-
mination of the post-tax value of the firm has only cash flow effects and no impact on the value of the net
assets. The post-tax cash flow is derived in each period by deducting the tax liabilities from the pre-tax
cash flow. The tax liabilities are derived by transforming the receipts and expenses into items of the tax
bases (i.e. on the one hand assets and liabilities and on the other hand profits and losses/charges) respect
given to depreciation allowances according to the relevant national rules and then applying the (functions of
the) tax rates and, if necessary, other relevant provisions (e.g. loss carryover and tax credits). As the tax
payments (liabilities) reduce the cash flow this also has an impact on the balancing investment or credit and
the connected interest receipts or credits. By taking these tax induced effects on interest income or expense
of each period into account the deferral of tax payments can be integrated easily into the model.
pre-tax cash flow at the end of the simulation period (companies’ or overall level)
- tax liabilities in each period
= post-tax cash flow at the end of the simulation period (companies’ or overall level)
+ value of the net assets at the end of the simulation period (companies’ or overall level)
(= assets in the capital stock at replacement prices - liabilities in the capital stock at nominal values)
= post-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period (companies’ or overall level)
pre-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period (companies’ or overall level)
- post-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period (companies’ or overall level)
= total average tax burden in currency units (companies’ or overall level)
In contrast to models which compute tax burdens solely based on pre-tax returns (yields),47 calculations
based on cash receipts and cash expenses considering balancing investments allows the entire computation
of all tax bases at any time during the period of simulation (as all relevant income and assets enter into the
tax base). As a consequence, the model can include complicated tax provisions such as progressive tax
rates, (investment) tax credit with upper ceiling, and loss carryovers without any difficulty.
In a third step both the pre-tax and the post-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period are
transformed into the pre-tax and post-tax return respectively:
r = [Vf (T) / Vi (0)]1/T - 1 and rs = [Vfs (T) / Vi (0)]1/T - 1
r = pre-tax return
rs = post-tax return
Vi = value of the firm at beginning of the simulation period
Vf = pre-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period
Vfs = post-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period
T = simulation period
                                                
47 E.g. the King-Fullerton-model. See KING, FULLERTON (1984).
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The return r (rs) represents the internal rate of growth of the value of the firm during the simulation period
before taxes (after taxes).48 In contrast to other models for calculating marginal or average effective tax
rates (e.g. calculation of net present values) in this model the return is not an exogenous but an endogenous
variable taking into account all the assumptions about the investment, financing and distribution policy at the
beginning of the simulation.
In a fourth step the effective average tax rate (EATR) is computed by deducting the post-tax return from
the pre-tax return and dividing this difference by the pre-tax return.
r - rs_____ = EATR
   r
3.2 Comparison of the tax burden in the five countries over a ten year period
The comparison is made in two stages. The first stage is to determine and compare the effective average
tax burden taking as a base data typical for a German manufacturing company of medium size. The second
stage (section 3.3) is to see how the results will be affected by alternative assumptions as regards the vari-
ous tax electives and the pre-tax data of the company. The paper uses information about the tax systems in
operation as of 1 January 1999.
3.2.1 Economic structure of the model firm
The model firm’s structure of the balance sheet and profit and loss account at the end of year six (the mid-
point of the ten year comparison) based on the assumption of German taxation is shown in table 2 and 3:49
Table 2: Model firm's structure of the balance sheet (period 6)
ASSETS DM LIABILITIES DM
A.  Fixed assets
I.  Intangible assets
II.  Tangible assets
1.  Real estate
2.  Machinery
3.  Office furniture and fixtures
III.  Financial assets
1.  Investments
2.  Long-term loans
B.  Current assets
I.  Stock
II.  Trade debtors
III.  Fund’s assets
IV.  Deposits
1.267.178
7.858.400
5.131.402
2.614.992
10.000.000
1.500.000
14.715.174
13.788.351
6.395.399
5.016.623
A.  Shareholders’ equity
I.  Share capital
II.  Profit brought forward
III.  Net income
B.  Provisions for Pensions
C.  Creditors
I.  Loans from third parties
II.  Loans from shareholders
III.  Trade creditors
IV.  Short-term debt
6.000.000
10.065.241
2.673.965
6.395.399
16.000.000
3.000.000
4.552.914
19.600.000
Total 68.287.519 Total 68.287.519
Balance sheet total: DM 68.3 m, Net income: DM 2.7 m, Tangible fixed assets to total balance sheet-ratio: 22.9 p.c.,
Equity capital to total balance sheet-ratio: 27.4 p.c., Return on equity capital (after taxes): 16.6 p.c., Return on total
capital (after taxes): 5.9 p.c.
Table 3: Model firm's structure of the profit and loss account (period 6)
DM
                                                
48 See SCHNEIDER, SIEGEL (1988), p. 19.
49 The data was taken from official German statistics. See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (1997a); DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK
(1997b); INDUSTRIEKREDITBANK (1997); STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT  (1997), p. 193-195, 206-207, 228-230, 464.
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Net sales or revenues 86.177.196
– Cost of goods sold 68.515.546
= Gross profit 17.661.650
– Selling expenses 2.717.460
– General and administrative expenses 7.763.206
+ Other revenues 5.099.511
– Other expenses 7.644.755
+ Investment earnings (dividends) 1.128.571
+ Interest income 441.274
– Interest expenses 1.140.000
= Operating income 5.065.585
– Income tax expenses (if deductible) 784.588
– Other taxes 5.315
= Taxable income (income before corporation tax) 4.275.682
Turnover: DM 86.2 m, Net profit ratio (after taxes): 3.1 p.c., Personal ex-
penditure: DM 19.9 m, Personal expenditure to turnover-ratio: 24.6 p.c.,
Taxable income: DM 4.3 m
3.2.2 Effective average tax burden at the level of the corporation
The effective average tax burden (EATR in per cent) for corporations under these assumptions over a ten
year period is (see figure 2 and table):
- Germany: DM 22.1 m (32.8 p.c.) - Netherlands: DM 17.2 m (23.6 p.c.)
- France: DM 25.3 m (39.9 p.c.) - United States: DM 21.1 m (30.7 p.c.)
- UK: DM 15.5 m (21.0 p.c.)
Figure 2: Tax burden of corporations in Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands and the USA
GER FRA UK NL USA
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The German tax burden is lower (DM 3.2 m, 12.6 p.c.) than the French but higher than the British (DM
6.6 m, 42.6 p.c.), the Dutch (DM 4.9 m, 28.5 p.c.) and the American (DM 1.0 m, 4.7 p.c.). The differ-
ences between the EATR are always the result of the given input data. Therefore they cannot be general-
ized. Moreover, these differences are caused by the national tax systems, taxes, tax bases and tariffs.
These elements are explained below.
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Germany: Since property tax (1997 ) and trade tax on capital (1998) were abolished in Germany only one
non-profit tax remains: real property tax. The significance of the real property tax is almost not relevant
compared to the profit taxes (corporation tax, solidarity levy, trade tax on income). Considering the de-
ductibility of the real property tax for the purpose of profit computation its portion in the total tax burden
amounts to only 0.7 p.c. Consequently profit taxes with a portion of 99.3 p.c. are more important.
Germany France UK Netherlands USA
EATR - corporation
absolute in DM
effective in p.c.
22.082.229
32.8
25.335.887
39.9
15.550.937
21.0
17.198.468
23.6
21.076.815
30.7
corporation tax and surcharges 16.996.152 13.764.899 13.763.084 16.936.049 16.749.927
trade/ franchise tax on income 4.924.057 - - - 2.658.256
trade tax on capital/ taxe professionnelle - 8.214.074 - - -
employer’s contribution - 2.710.659 - - -
property tax - - - - 1.668.632
real property tax 162.020 646.255 1.787.853 262.419 -
France: The structure of the French tax system differs significantly from the German. There are three non-
profit taxes: real property tax, trade tax (taxe professionnelle) and employers' taxes - taxe d'apprentissage,
participation des employeurs à la formation professionnelle continue and participation des employeurs à
l'effort de construction. Their portion in the total tax burden is 45.7 p.c. considering that they are deductible
for tax purposes.
- The burden of the real property tax is about three times higher than in Germany. This is not due to the
tax base (rental value compared to standard tax value) but to the tariff (24 p.c. compared to 1.5 p.c.).
- The taxe professionnelle and the employers' taxes burden capital- and labour-intensive companies in
particular: The tax base of the taxe professionnelle comprises 16 p.c. of the acquisition costs of tangible
fixed assets and 18 p.c. of the payroll. Besides a general deduction of 16 p.c. there is no allowance for
other deductions (e.g. debts). The average tariff is 23 p.c. Moreover, the total payroll is charged by the
employers' taxes. Their nominal burden amounts to 2.45 p.c. of the payroll. Consequently the total bur-
den of the payroll due to taxe professionnelle and employers' taxes is around 5.8 p.c.
- Summing up, the burden of non-profit taxes is about 70 times higher than in Germany.
Compared to Germany the portion of the corporation tax is significantly smaller (23.5 p.c. less). This de-
rives from a lower base - in particular more favourable depreciation rules - and a lower tax rate (40.0 p.c.
compared to 42.2 p.c. including solidarity levy). Adding trade tax on income in Germany, the difference
between the burden of profit taxes rises to 59.2 p.c. In the case of France it has to be considered that the
statutory rate of corporation tax is 33.33 p.c. only. Since 1995 there is a common surcharge of 10 p.c. In
1997 another surcharge of 15 p.c. was implemented for corporations with a turnover of more than FF 50
m. This latter surcharge was reduced in 1999 to 10 p.c. thus the actual tax rate is 40 p.c.
United Kingdom: In the UK at the company’s level, there are only corporation tax and real property tax
(rates). Due to the average tax rate (47.3 p.c.) the burden of real property tax is significantly higher than in
Germany and France. Nevertheless the influence of the rates is low in comparison to the corporation tax.
The share in the total tax burden amounts to 11.5 p.c. and is therefore higher than in Germany but much
lower than in France. The level of the total tax burden in the UK is determined by the corporation tax
which is lower than in Germany (-23.5 p.c.) but approximately the same as in France. This result is not due
to the tax base - the rules concerning profit computation are more favourable in Germany and France- but
to the lower tax rate (30 p.c.).
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Netherlands: Like in the UK the total tax burden in the Netherlands is above all influenced by the corpora-
tion tax whereby its share is 98.5 p.c. In addition to corporation tax only a real property tax is levied which
is lower than in France (-54.8 p.c.) and the UK (-85.3 p.c.) but higher than in Germany (+62.0 p.c.). The
burden of the Dutch corporation tax is almost the same as in Germany (although the Dutch corporation tax
rate is lower (35 p.c.)) but higher than in France (+23.0 p.c. due to less favourable rules for profit determi-
nation) and the UK (+23.0 p.c. due to less favourable rules for profit determination and a higher tax rate).
United States: For the USA it is assumed that the company is located in California. Thus one non-profit
tax at the state’s level (property tax) has to be considered whose share in the total tax burden is 7.9 p.c.
As California levies a franchise tax on income in addition to federal corporation tax, there are two profit
taxes in the USA. Their portion in the total tax burden amounts to 92.1 p.c.
- Like the German trade tax on income the franchise tax on income in California is an additional tax on
profits. The basis of assessment is similar to that for US-federal corporation tax but with fewer modifi-
cations than in Germany. In particular, interest expenses are fully deductible and therefore the basis of
assessment tends to be lower than for trade tax on income in Germany (where 50 p.c. of the interest
expenses have to be added back). Moreover, the German net effective rate is higher than in the United
States (17.6 compared to 8.8 p.c.) so that the total local tax income burden in Germany exceeds the
corresponding US burden by about 85.3 p.c.
- Compared to Germany the portion of the corporation tax is somewhat lower (1.5 p.c. less). This de-
rives from a lower tax rate (39 p.c. compared to 42.2 p.c. including solidarity levy). However, adding
German trade tax and US franchise tax on income respectively, the difference between the burden of
profit taxes rises to 12.9 p.c. in favour of the USA. In comparison to the other three countries, the US
burden of corporation tax is little lower than in the Netherlands but higher than in France and the UK
which - as corporation tax rate is higher (less) in France (the UK) - all in all proves that the rules for
profit computation are more (less) favourable in France (the UK).
3.2.2 Effective average tax burden at the overall level (corporation and shareholder)
In our base case example for a medium-sized company the model includes 10 shareholders (natural per-
sons) who are located in the same country as the corporation. In each country a uniform profit distribution
of DM 1.0 m (16 p.c. of share capital) including tax credit plus an uniform income of each shareholder
from other sources is considered. Under these assumptions the overall effective average tax burden (EATR
in per cent) of corporations and shareholders over a ten year period is (see figure 3 and table):
- Germany: DM 30.1 m (37.0 p.c.) - Netherlands: DM 26.9 m (31.8 p.c.)
- France: DM 36.4 m (48.6 p.c.) - United States: DM 28.1 m (33.8 p.c.)
- UK: DM 22.7 m (25.8 p.c.)
Compared with the tax burden at the level of the corporation the overall burden at the shareholders’ level is
higher. From the German perspective, on the one hand, there is an advantage compared to France which is
rising (DM 6.4 m compared to DM 3.2 m) and a disadvantage compared to the Netherlands (DM 3.2 m
compared to DM 4.9 m) which is declining. On the other hand the advantages of the UK (DM 7.0 m
compared to DM 6.6 m) and the United States (DM 1.9 m compared to DM 1.0 m) which compared to
Germany are rising.
Consequently, shareholders in France and the Netherlands are subject to a higher tax burden than in Ger-
many, the UK, and the United States, where we find the lowest tax burden. The total average effective tax
burdens and the differences compared to Germany are (see figure 3 and table):
17
- Germany: DM 8.0 m - Netherlands: DM 9.6 m (20.0 p.c. more)
- France: DM 11.1 m (38.7 p.c. more) - United States: DM 7.0 m (12.5 p.c. less)
- UK: DM 7.2 m (10.0 p.c. less)
Ultimately, these differences come from the domestic corporation tax systems, the individual income tax
rates including supplementary levies, and capital taxes at the shareholder’s level:
Corporation tax systems: Germany totally avoids double taxation of domestic dividends by crediting the
corporation tax borne by the company in full against the ultimate income tax liability of the shareholder.50
Although the French corporation tax system, like the German system, is an imputation system, economic
double taxation of dividends is not entirely eliminated. Due to the surcharges on the corporation tax rate
and the limitation of the tax credit (avoir fiscal) to one half of the distributed dividend, only 75 p.c. of the
underlying corporation tax are credited against personal income tax. Although there is no imputation sys-
tem, the situation in the Netherlands is quite similar. Instead of a tax credit, qualified shareholders (partici-
pation of at least 5 p.c. as considered in our base case) are entitled to a so-called shareholder relief, grant-
ing a lower income tax rate on dividends (25 p.c.) instead of the statutory income tax rate (marginal rate of
60 p.c.). Since 1999, Great Britain also applies a shareholder relief system. On the one hand, dividends
carry a tax credit of 10 p.c. which is, however, not refunded. On the other hand the top income tax rate for
dividends is now lower (32.5 p.c.) than the ordinary top income tax rate (40 p.c.). Altogether, for top rate
shareholders the tax credit and the reduced income tax rate provide that about 58 p.c. of the underlying
corporation tax are credited against personal income tax. In the USA there is no tax credit or relief at all
(classical system). To the extend that the tax credit or relief is denied or restricted, the corporation tax
represents a final burden, which tends to make dividend distributions less attractive than they would be in
Germany.
Figure 3: Tax burden of corporations and shareholders in Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands
and the USA
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50 However, trade tax on corporate income is not credited against personal income tax in Germany.
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EATR - corporation
absolute in DM
effective in p.c.
22.082.229
32.8
25.335.887
39.9
15.550.937
21.0
17.198.468
23.6
21.076.815
30,7
EATR - shareholder 7.975.409 11.078.515 7.192.880 9.663.370 7.026.890
- income tax 7.975.409 10.873.402 7.192.880 8.847.690 6.935.820
- property tax - 205.113 - 815.680 91.070
EATR - overall level
absolute in DM
effective in p.c.
30.057.638
37.0
36.414.402
48.6
22.743.817
25.8
26.861.838
31.8
28.103.705
33.8
Income tax rates: The apparent advantage for the full imputation system in Germany is significantly re-
duced or overcompensated by the higher income tax rate (including supplementary levies such as church
tax and solidarity levy) compared with the UK and the USA. This is not the case, however, compared with
the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, relief is granted exclusively for dividend income whereas income from
other sources is fully taxed at a rate of 60 p.c. (e.g. interest income). Of the five countries that are under
review, France has the highest maximum rate (including several surcharges on income tax (prélèvements
fiscaux)). This results in the highest income tax burden.
Capital taxes: France and the Netherlands charge the total assets including the value of shares in compa-
nies to annual property taxes. The USA (e.g. the State of California) also levies a property tax but exempts
the value of shares from the tax base. Germany (since 1997) and the UK do not levy any net assets or
similar form of capital tax. As a result, the initial disadvantages to French and Dutch shareholders from the
restricted tax credit and shareholder relief respectively are further increased in comparison to the other
three countries.
3.3 Influence of tax electives and altering business data on the tax burden
3.3.1 Primary remarks
Since the effective average tax burden depends on the concrete economic data of a corporation, differ-
ences between the structures of the national tax systems can
- on the one hand distort competition in the European Union (EU) and
- on the other hand influence decisions of companies such as location, investment, financing, dividend
policies etc.
Table 4: Sets of variations
Rules for profit computation Business data
Tax electives
Uniform tax base
Investment (tangible fixed assets to total balance sheet ratio)
Financing (equity to total capital ratio)
Profitability (pre tax return)
Personal intensity (personal expenditure to turnover ratio)
Industry (specific company data for different industries)
Dividend policies (rate of distribution)
In order to work out the dimension of these distortions the effects of alternative assumptions about the input
data on the EATR is analyzed by using „what-if“ analyses. Therefore we differ between on the one hand
alternative rules for profit computation and on the other hand different business data (see table 4).
3.3.2 Profit computation
3.3.2.1 Tax electives
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The countries under consideration offer several choices for computing the fiscal profit. In order to measure
the impact of these tax electives on the tax burden we consider a situation in which the relevant expenses
are deducted nearer the time they are actually incurred (case A) and a situation in which they are deducted
as soon as possible (case B). The tax electives that were taken into account for the calculations - deprecia-
tion rules, accounting for production costs, and stock valuation - are shown in table 5. In addition, in order
to find out to what extent the differences between the effective tax burdens for case A and B are related to
the tax systems, taxes and tariffs, the effective average tax burden is computed with respect to three distinct
rules for taxation (situations I-III):
- Situation I: The first set of calculations takes into account the current tax rules in each country.
- Situation II: For the second set of calculations it is assumed that all non-profit taxes and profit taxes
other than corporation tax will be abolished. Corporation tax still is levied at current rates. With this as-
sumption it is possible to work out the effects of the non-profit taxes and the local profit taxes on the
effective average tax burden.
- Situation III: For the third set of calculations a uniform corporation tax rate of 35 p.c. for each country
is considered. This assumption allows on the one hand to work out the effects of the corporation tax
rate on the effective average tax burden (by comparing EATR for situation II and III). On the other
hand the remaining differences can solely be attributed to the national rules for profit computation. Thus
their impact on the EATR can be worked out.
Table 5: Tax electives considered for the variation
country Germany France UK Netherlands USA
depreciation plant and machinery
- case A
- case B
straight line
declining balance
straight line
declining balance
pooling
pooling
straight line
declining balance
straight line
declining balance
production costs
- case A
- case B
full costs
partial costs
full costs
partial costs
full costs
full costs
full costs
partial costs
full costs
full costs
stock valuation
- case A
- case B
weighted average
lifo
fifo
weighted average
fifo
weighted average
weighted average
lifo
fifo
lifo
(1) The results for situation I show the impact of the differences between the national tax electives for the
determination of taxable profits on the effective average tax rate. Considering the current tax regula-
tions and the economic data for the typical model firm the spread between case A and case B and,
hence, the impact of the tax electives on the EATR is highest in Germany and lowest in the UK.
- The reason for the low impact in the UK is that there is no formal linkage between financial and tax
accounting wherefore the various choices for financial accounting have no effect on the taxable
profit.
- Although in the Netherlands and in the USA there also exist distinct rules for the determination of
taxable profits, there is an obvious influence of tax electives on the EATR. These independent elec-
tives that are granted in the range of depreciation and stock valuation cause a variation in the EATR
between case A and B of 21.0 p.c. (Netherlands) and 18.6 p.c. (USA) respectively.
- In Germany and France there is a strong linkage between financial and tax accounting resulting in a
spread between the highest and the lowest EATR of 23.6 p.c. (Germany) and 10.5 p.c. (France)
respectively.
Figure 4: Effects of depreciation methods, calculation of production costs and stock valuation
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(2)  While comparing the results for situation I and II we can draw two conclusions:
- The impact of the national tax electives on the EATR would become less when all non-profit con-
tributions were abolished (e.g. the difference between the EATR in case A and case B is smaller).
Thus the effects of the rules for the computation of taxable profits are also influenced by non-profit
contributions due to the interrelations of the taxes (e.g. a fraction of the non-profit taxes is part of
the production costs).
- Moreover, it is evident that the EATR in France above all is influenced by non-profit contributions.
In Germany, in contrast, the EATR above all is the consequence of the high corporation tax rate.
(3)  The results for situation III show that the rules for the determination of the corporation tax base are
most favourable in France and the Netherlands as the EATR are lowest in case B (about 15 p.c.).
Thereafter follow Germany (16.2 p.c.), the USA (16.6 p.c.), and the UK (17.7 p.c.).
Altogether we can conclude that the different rules for profit computation and the existing electives have an
impact on the EATR. Depending on the particular choices for the accounting strategy the order of the
countries in the ranking between the highest and the lowest EATR can even change. If we take Germany
and France as examples we see that EATR in France can be higher (case A in France) or lower than in
Germany (case B in France and case A in Germany). Thus harmonizing tax bases as suggested by the
„Ruding Committee“51 is besides the harmonization of taxes and tax systems another important condition
for harmonizing company taxation in Europe.
3.3.2.2 Uniform tax base (International Accounting Standards)
If we are aware that differences between the tax bases have an impact on the EATR we still do not know
how important this impact is compared to other elements constituting the tax burden (e.g. corporation tax
system, taxes, and tariffs). In order to get some clue about this impact we considered a situation with an
uniform tax base in all five countries. In doing so we assumed that the provisions according to the „Interna-
                                                
51 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1992a), p. 211-218.
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tional Accounting Standards“ (IAS) are forming without exception the basis for the determination of taxable
profits in all the countries.52 In particular, we considered the following provisions (IAS benchmark treat-
ments):
Provision IAS benchmark treatment
depreciation method only straight-line
depreciation period true economic lifetime
production costs full costs
stock valuation first in first out
pension costs outside funding (pension fund), projected method, market interest rate
development costs capitalization and straight-line depreciation over 10 years
Figure 5 compares the EATR in the case of national accounting standards (current situation) and in the case
of the application of the IAS (uniform tax base).53 What we see from the results is first that the EATR
would rise in all five countries if the IAS were relevant for the computation of taxable profits. Thus, taking
the IAS as a benchmark we can conclude that the national accounting provisions are more generous. How-
ever, compared to the UK and the Netherlands, the rise of the EATR would be higher in Germany,
France, and the USA. This can be attributed to the fact that the accounting provisions in the Anglo-Saxon
states are already corresponding with the IAS to a greater extend than the provision in the European conti-
nental states (e.g. Germany and France) exception made for the USA.
Figure 5: National tax bases, uniform tax base, and EATR
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However, we have to admit that an uniform corporation tax base (e.g. tax accounting according to the IAS
in all countries) would not eliminate the differences between the national EATR to a great extend. The re-
maining differences according to the national corporation tax systems, other taxes, and tariffs are still high
                                                
52 It is quite likely that the IAS form the basis for a reform of the European Accounting Directive. See MONTI (1998), p.
1763-1764; SCHREIBER (1999), p. 906.
53 See OESTREICHER, SPENGEL (1999), for a detailed analysis.
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and vary between 17.9 p.c. (UK) and 40.2 p.c. (France). Thus, to sum up, a vital reform and harmoniza-
tion of company taxation in Europe should not just concentrate on one element of the tax system. From our
calculation we draw the conclusion that the differing (corporation) tax rates have a higher impact on the
EATR than the differences between the tax bases.54
3.3.3 Business data of the model firm
3.3.3.1 Investment policy
To make the impact of the structure of the types of assets on the EATR clear we vary the tangible fixed
assets to total balance sheet ratio of the model firm. In doing so the portion of the tangible fixed assets in
the total assets (i.e. balance sheet total) compared with the base case data is raised or reduced by 5 and
10 p.c. respectively. In other words, this variation takes into account a change in the model firm’s capital
intensity. In order to keep the total balance sheet constant the value for the financial assets was reduced or
raised accordingly. Moreover, so that the effect of the modified investment policy can be isolated both the
turnover and the interest receipts remain unchanged.
The results in figure 6 show that, with the exception of Germany, the EATR is increasing with the capital
intensity. Thus, only the situation in Germany shows the expected result: Due to a shift from less generous
rules for non depreciable assets (i.e. financial assets) to more generous capital allowance practice for de-
preciable assets (i.e. tangible fixed assets) the EATR is decreasing with the capital intensity. The increasing
EATR in the other countries is due to the levy of non-profit taxes.
Figure 6: Tangible fixed assets to total balance sheet ratio and EATR
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- In the case of the UK and the Netherlands, it is above all the higher portion of the real property tax in
the overall tax burden that is overcompensating the effects of the capital allowances and therefore deci-
sive for the increase. However, the increase of the EATR is only minor.
                                                
54 This is also a major finding of other studies on the effective (marginal) tax burden in Europe. See, for example, CARON
& STEVENS/ BAKER & MCKENZIE (1999).
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- In contrast to the situation in the UK and the Netherlands the increase of the EATR in France and in the
USA are noticeable. This can be explained by the structure of the French „taxe professionnelle“ and the
US property tax. The bases of both taxes include tangible fixed assets but exempt intangibles and finan-
cial assets. Therefore, while the capital intensity is rising, the higher portion of tangible fixed assets in the
tax bases is not compensated by a lower portion of financial assets as these assets are exempt from
non-profit taxation.
It seems reasonable to conclude from the results that capital intensive production is discriminated in all
countries except Germany. The reason of this distortion of investment decisions is the levy of non-profit
taxes or more precisely the absence of tax bases that include all relevant types of assets and of uniform
rules for the evaluation of the assets. However, the changes in the EATR-ranking of the countries are only
minor. With the exception of Germany and the USA there are no other countries that change their posi-
tions.
3.3.3.2 Structure of finance
The aim of this section is to investigate the impact on the EATR of changing assumptions for the financing of
the corporation. Therefore, the weights for the sources of financing are gradually changed by increasing the
equity to total capital ratio from 25 p.c. to 100 p.c. This increase of the equity to total capital ratio is ac-
companied by a reduction of the interest expenses for long term debts. The other data does not change.
From the results shown in figure 7 we can see that the EATR is increasing with the equity to total capital
ratio. Therefore, the national tax systems are not neutral towards the source of company finance. The most
important reason for this result is the effect of the corporation tax. While interest expenses  are deductible
from the taxable profits dividends must be paid out of taxed profits. Thus, the corporation tax burden is
rising the more a company is financed by equity capital.
The discrimination of equity financing at the level of the corporation is most evident in Germany and the
USA. Besides the high level of the corporation tax rate this results from the levy of other taxes in both
countries that do not treat the payments for debt and equity capital equally. On the one hand, in Germany
interest expenses for long term debt can be deducted to an extend of 50 p.c. from the base of the trade tax
on income, in the USA interest expenses are even fully deductible from the base of the franchise tax on
income levied by the states. On the other hand there are no reductions of the relevant tax bases for divi-
dends paid to the shareholders. Therefore, in both countries the EATR are increasing disproportionately to
the equity to total capital ratio.
Figure 7: Equity to total capital ratio and EATR (level of corporation)
24
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
25 50 75 100
Equity to total capital ratio (p.c.)
E
ffe
ct
iv
e 
A
ve
ra
ge
 T
ax
 R
at
e 
(p
.c
.)
GER FRA UK NL USA
Altogether the results show that the national EATR both rise and converge with an increasing equity to total
capital ratio but they do not cross and thus do not change the ranking of our base case model firm.
Whether the increasing EATR definitely proof a tax driven discrimination of equity financing cannot be
stated ultimately. For that purpose it is necessary to consider the taxation of the relevant payments (i.e.
dividends and interests) in the hands of the shareholders (see section 3.3.5.2 below).
3.3.3.3 Profitability
The EATR also depends on the assumed value for the pre-tax return of the company. There are at least
two reasons for this dependence:
(1) The relative weight of the non-profit taxes in the effective tax burden depends on the pre-tax return.
(2) The ultimate value of depreciation allowance (i.e. the amount of the interest gain) depends on the cash
flows of each period. If, for example, the total amount of depreciation in one period exceeds the cash
flow (and the other pre-tax earnings) in the same period there is no full tax saving due to depreciation.
If there is no possibility of a loss carry back the tax saving rather becomes effective in subsequent pe-
riods through the mechanism of a loss carry forward.
In order to find out whether the estimates for the EATR made so far are robust for the assumptions made
for the pre-tax return or not, the EATR are recalculated by gradually increasing or decreasing the value for
the pre-tax return in sequences of 5 p.c. compared with the base case data.
The curves in figure 8 show that the EATR is decreasing with the value for the pre-tax return in all five
countries. The reason is that the impact of non-profit taxes and of comparatively disadvantageous depre-
ciation allowances on the EATR become less important. In the countries that levy high real estate taxes
(UK) or additional non-profit taxes for corporation (France and the USA), the reduction of the EATR is
most evident. On the other hand it is obvious that the EMTR, in particular in France, and also in the USA
are rising as the pre-tax return is falling, because non-profit taxes then constitute a relatively high fraction of
a smaller pre-tax return.
The most important aspect of these results is that the EATR converge but do not cross as the pre-tax re-
turn is rising. The EATR seem to converge to a value below the statutory rates for the national profit taxes
25
as the tax savings due to depreciation allowances are still effective. From another perspective, the EATR
for Germany and the USA can cross if the profitability of the company is low. Therefore it cannot be con-
cluded that the German EATR is always higher than the EATR in the USA.
Figure 8: Pre-tax return and EATR
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To sum up, the value of the EATR in one country as well as the differences between the national EATR are
highly sensitive to the assumption made for the value of the pre-tax return. Above all this becomes relevant
for smaller pre-tax returns.
3.3.3.4 Personal intensity
Labour costs are not considered explicitly for the calculations. As these costs are fully tax deductible they
receive in principle a tax saving similar to interest expenses. Therefore, as a general rule, a company’s net
labour costs will decrease with the statutory tax rate on profits. Assuming equal gross wages in all coun-
tries, net labour costs will be lowest in countries with the highest statutory tax rates on profits (e.g. Ger-
many). There are, however, two exceptions from the immediate and full deductibility of labour costs: (1)
their inclusion in the production costs and hence the postponement of their deductibility to the period in
which the underlying products are sold and (2) the levy of payroll taxes.
For the assessment of the impact of the personal intensity on the effective tax burden the EATR were cal-
culated by gradually increasing or decreasing the value for the personal expenditure to turnover ratio in
sequences of 5 p.c. compared with the base case data. Moreover, so that the total expenses remain un-
changed, the other expenses were modified accordingly.
Referring to the results shown in figure 9 it is obvious that the EATR is increasing with the personal intensity
in all countries. Therefore the assumptions about the personal intensity of a company have an impact on the
EATR. However, the EATR neither cross or converge (exception for France). The reason for the ob-
served increase of the EATR in all countries is the inclusion of personal expenditure in the production costs
which lower the value of the tax saving due to the deductibility from the tax base to some extent as previ-
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ously shown.55 Although the EATR is increasing with the personal intensity the inclusion of personal expen-
diture in the production costs cannot be interpreted as a discrimination of labour against capital-intensive
industries because capital allowances (depreciation) are also part of the production costs.
Figure 9: Personal expenditure to turnover ratio and EATR
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The personal intensity has the highest impact on the EATR in France because France is the only country
covered by this study that levies taxes on the payroll of a company other than wage taxes or social security
contributions. As already pointed out the „taxe professionnelle“ and the three employer taxes burden the
total payroll by around 5.8 p.c. At present the French tax rules are far from ideal from an economic point
of view. With regard to „taxe professionnelle“ and employer taxes we can state that both capital- and la-
bour-intensive industries are bearing high EATR in France.
3.3.4 Effective average tax burden of different industries
The effective tax burden always depends on concrete individual cases which provide the economic data for
the calculation. The results of the calculations and the sensitivity analysis in the above sections made clear
that there exist various values for the EATR in one country. Neither, therefore is it possible to make univer-
sally valid statements regarding the differences of the EATR across the countries. The EATR depends for
example on the types of assets (investment), the sources of finance, the productivity or the personal inten-
sity of a company. According to the character of these factors influencing the tax burden, the result will be
different in international comparison.
In order to investigate the impact of alternative weights for assets, sources of finance etc. this section cal-
culates and compares the EATR of 10 other industries in addition to the base case which referred to data
from the manufacturing sector. Figure 10 shows the effective average tax burdens as they were computed
by the European Tax Analyzer for corporations from the different industries  (Germany is the zero line).
                                                
55 See FULLERTON (1986), p. 290, for a criticism that the effects of wage deductibility are not considered in effective
marginal tax rate models.
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The comparison of the tax burden is based on company data which is regarded as typical for the selected
industries.56
In Germany, a comparably high level of profit taxes and only negligible non-profit taxes can be found. From
the point of view of German company, this means that the lower the profitability the higher the advantage in
the tax position compared to other countries and vice versa. This becomes very clear if we look at the rela-
tive position of a company from the Building and Construction Sector. In contrast to the base case
manufacturing company this company has a very low profitability. Thus, as the EATR of this company
above all is influenced by non-profit taxes, Germany can improve its relative position in the country ranking.
A low profitability in comparison to the base case manufacturing company is also decisive for the more
favourable German position of the sectors Metal Production, Food and Beverages, Commerce, and
Automotive Vehicles.
Figure 10: Comparison of the EATR for selected industries
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Although the profitability in the sectors Engineering and Electrical Engineering is also low in comparison
to the base case manufacturing company, the relative position of Germany towards the UK, the Nether-
lands and the USA is deteriorating. The reason is that in both sectors the advantages of the low profitability
are overcompensated by the effects of the low capital intensity. Thus, the impact of the comparably favour-
able German depreciation regulations on the EATR is only minor. The reason for the improvement of Ger-
many in comparison with France is the high personal intensity of both industries.
The Transport industry has very favourable tax conditions in Germany. The reasons are the comparably
high capital intensity and the comparably low debt-to-equity ratio.
Compared to the base case the relative positions for Chemical Engineering and Service Trade are worse in
Germany. The reason in the case of Chemical Engineering is the high equity ratio whereby the discrimina-
                                                
56 The data was taken from official German statistics. See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (1997).
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tion of equity financing in Germany due to the trade tax on income is noticeable. In the case of Service
Trade it is the high profitability that causes the deterioration of Germany.
To sum up, the comparison reveals that different corporate economic data can effect variations in the tax
burden differences between the countries. However, the industry comparison also arrives at the result that
the ranking of the countries remains (almost) the same. According to this ranking, the German tax burden is
below the French one and close to the one of the USA, but conversely, the low level of taxation in the UK
and the Netherlands is not achieved by any of the cases examined.
3.3.5 Sensitivity of the overall effective average tax burden
Just as for the level of the corporation the tax burden for the overall level (i.e. including the taxation of the
shareholders) is influenced by the assumptions about the economic data. Referring to the variables that
have a large impact on the overall EATR we consider as relevant the distribution policy of the company
and the sources of company finance provided by the shareholders.
3.3.5.1 Dividend policy
In order to work out the impact on the overall EATR of changing assumptions for the distribution policy the
rate of distribution of the corporation was gradually increased from zero (i.e. full retention of profits) to 100
p.c. (i.e. full distribution of profits). The assumptions about the number and the tax status of the sharehold-
ers are the same as in the base case (i.e. 10 non tax-exempt individual domestic shareholders). Figure 11
shows the results.57
If the profits are fully retained in the corporation (i.e. zero distribution) the overall EATR above all is
influenced by the taxes of the corporations. Due to the differences between the tax burden of the corpora-
tions already explained above, the overall EATR is highest in France and lowest in the UK.
In the case of profit distribution, however, the overall EATR is increasing with the rate of distribution in all
five countries. From the results it is obvious that Germany can improve its relative position in the country
ranking while the positions of France and the USA are deteriorating. The USA even lose two places in the
country ranking. This result can be attributed to the different corporation tax systems and the progression of
the income tax rates.58
- Corporation tax systems: Due to the full imputation system in Germany the underlying corporation tax
on distributed profits is merely replaced by the income tax of the individual shareholders. However, in
our example, as the (average) income tax rate for a small number of shareholders is higher than the cor-
poration tax rate the overall EATR is increasing with the rate of distribution. In the other four countries
the corporation tax systems do not avoid double taxation of dividends with corporation tax and personal
income tax. Either part of the underlying corporation tax (e.g. partial imputation system in France,
                                                
57 Here it is assumed that the corporation basically has only domestic sources of income which excludes cross-border
economic activities. In these circumstances the assessment of the corporation tax systems is completely different
from the domestic case. For an analysis of cross-border EATR using the European Tax Analyzer model see JACOBS,
SPENGEL (1997a).
58 It has to be noted that there are additional reasons in the grounds of taxation that explain the differences between the
national EATR (but not the increasing EATR in the case of profit distribution). First there are company taxes that can
never be credited against personal income tax (e.g. real estate tax in all countries, trade or franchise taxes on income in
Germany and the USA, and non-profit taxes in France and the USA). Moreover there are property taxes (e.g. personal
net wealth taxes in France, the Netherlands, and the USA) at the level of the shareholders.
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shareholder relief system in the UK and the Netherlands) or the total amount of corporation tax (e.g.
classical system in the USA) becomes a definite burden.
Figure 11: Dividend policy and EATR (level of corporation and shareholder)
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- Progression of income tax rates: From the point of view of Germany, however, the advantages re-
sulting from the full imputation system are compensated by lower (average) income tax rates in the UK,
the Netherlands, and the USA. This explains why the British and the Dutch overall EATR, although they
do converge to the German, are always lower than the German. Only France has a higher (average) in-
come tax rate compared to Germany which above all is caused by the levy of several surcharges. This is
an additional disadvantage in the case of profit distribution in France.
To sum up, the EATR at the overall level and the differences between the countries in an international com-
parison are depending on the assumptions about the dividend policy of the corporation. All of the countries
considered in this study favour profit retention compared with profit distribution. Moreover, depending on
the rate of distribution the EATR of the countries do cross (e.g. the US EATR with the Dutch and the
German). For these reasons it is impossible to make universally valid statements about the EATR at the
overall level.59
3.3.5.2 Equity to total capital ratio
The corporation tax systems of France, the UK, the Netherlands and the USA do not completely avoid
double taxation of dividends. In consequence of this (mitigated) double taxation, distributed profits of a
corporation are taxed with personal income tax and that part of the corporation tax that cannot be credited
against the personal income tax, whereas other sources of capital income (e.g. interest) are only taxed once
                                                
59 Moreover, the situation in the case of a great number of shareholders earning only small amounts of dividends, tax
exempt or foreign shareholders can be completely different. See  JACOBS ET. AL. (1999).
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with personal income tax. This unequal taxation of capital income can distort, inter alia, the decision of a
shareholder whether to finance a corporation with equity or with debt capital.60
This section investigates the impact on the EATR at the shareholders’ level of changing assumptions about
the financing of the corporation. Therefore, it is assumed that the corporation is entirely financed by its
shareholders with debt or equity capital. In the case of debt-financing the shareholders receive interest in-
come for the loan granted to the corporation at a fixed rate, in the case of equity financing the profits are
fully distributed to the shareholders. The weights for the sources of finance are gradually changed by in-
creasing the equity to total capital ratio from 25 p.c. to 100 p.c. Figure 12 shows the results:
Figure 12: Equity to total capital ratio and EATR (level of corporation and shareholder)
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- In Germany, as can be expected from the full imputation corporation tax system, the source of finance
of the corporation has almost no impact on the EATR at the overall level. Therefore, a full imputation
system is neutral towards financing decisions (in a domestic context as analysed here). The reason for
the slight increase of the EATR with the equity to total capital ratio is the preferential treatment of debt
financing within the scope of the trade tax on income as half of the interest expenses are deductible (and
no allowance at all is given for equity).
- As expected, EATR in the UK and the USA are increasing with the equity to total capital ratio, because
the corporation tax systems in both countries do not eliminate the double taxation of dividends and
hence discriminate equity against debt financing.
- Referring to the effects solely attributable to the corporation tax system one would also expect a dis-
crimination of equity financing in France and in the Netherlands. However, the trend of the EATR show
the opposite, i.e. a discrimination of debt financing. There are of course different reasons for these re-
sults in both countries. In the Netherlands it is the combination of the corporation and personal income
tax rate that results in a lower (combined) tax rate on dividends: Whereas interest income is taxed at a
                                                
60 The impact of different corporation tax systems on the financing of corporations by their shareholders is analysed by
JACOBS (1989); JACOBS, SPENGEL (1993).
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marginal income tax rate of 60 p.c., dividend income is taxed at a rate of 51.25 p.c. only (i.e. corpora-
tion tax 35 p.c. plus reduced tax rate for dividends of 25 p.c. on a dividend of 65 p.c. (= 16.25 p.c.)).
In France, the discrimination of equity financing caused by the partial imputation system is overcompen-
sated by a lower property tax burden on equity financing (i.e. the taxable value of shares is lower than
the taxable value of loans according to the valuation rules of the French tax code).
Altogether the results show that in none of the countries covered by this study the taxation is entirely neutral
towards the financing of a corporation. Moreover, there exists no common pattern as to a preferential
taxation of debt or equity financing. As there are countries that either favour debt financing (e.g. Germany
and, in particular, the UK and the USA) or equity financing (e.g. France and the Netherlands), both the
amount of the national EATR and the ranking of the countries from the lowest to the highest EATR rather
depend on the assumptions about the equity to total capital ratio.
3.3.6 Changes in the effective average tax rates over the period 1995-2000
The last section summarises the main tax reforms and their consequences for the EATR both for the level of
the corporations and the shareholders. We refer to the period 1995-99 and give an outlook to tax reform
proposals in Germany61 and France62 already announced for the near future (denoted as year 2000). The
aspects to the tax systems referred to and entered in the calculations of the EATR are those that apply to
the manufacturing sector and that are generally available. This excludes, above all, special investment incen-
tive schemes.
The results for the level of the corporations in figure 13 show that in the period 1995-99 the EATR has
declined in Germany, the UK, and the USA, has risen in France, and has not changed in the Netherlands.
As a consequence, the average EATR has reduced from 30.6 p.c. (1995) to 29.6 p.c. (1999). The an-
nounced tax reforms in Germany and France could cause a further reduction of the average EATR to 26.1
p.c. (2000).
Figure 13: EATR over the period 1995-2000 (level of corporation)
                                                
61 See BRÜHLER EMPFEHLUNGEN ZUR REFORM DER UNTERNEHMENSBESTEUERUNG (1999).
62 See Art. 44 de la Loi de Finances 1999.
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The trend of the EATR for the level of the shareholders shown in figure 14 is similar: For the period
1995-99 EATR has declined in four countries (Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and the USA) and
risen in France, the average EATR has reduced from 37.8 p.c. (1995) to 35.4 p.c. (1999). A further re-
duction to 31.6. p.c. (2000) could occur if the announced tax reforms in Germany and France came into
force.
Figure 14: EATR over the period 1995-2000 (level of corporation and shareholder)
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The dominant trend in the tax reforms has been the lowering of the statutory tax rates on profits. This
has been seen in three out of five countries:
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- Germany:63 The statutory corporation tax rate on retained earnings was reduced form 45 p.c. to 40
p.c. (1999). The solidarity levy on the corporation and personal income tax has fallen from 7.5 p.c. to
5.5 p.c. (1998). The proposed reform for the year 2000 aims to introduce an uniform and linear tax rate
of not more than 35 p.c. regardless of the distribution policy (and the legal form of the corporation).
This „business tax“ should cover both corporation income tax (including solidarity levy) and trade tax.
- United Kingdom: The statutory corporation tax rate has fallen from 33 p.c. to 31 p.c. (1998) and then
to 30 p.c. (1999).64
- United States: The rate of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) fell from 28 p.c. to 20 p.c. (1997).
In contrast to earlier periods not covered by this study the lowering of the tax rates was not combined with
important extensions of the tax base.65 An exception has to be made for the present reforms in Germany.
The tax rate reductions in 1999 were largely financed by cut backs of tax incentives, a long list of disallow-
ing certain expenses altogether from deduction, and changes in tax accounting that lead to a deferral of the
tax deductibility of much expenditure until nearer the time it is actually incurred.66 The reform proposal for
the year 2000 intends a further broadening of the tax base by cutting back the depreciation rules both for
machinery (declining balance only 20 instead of 30 p.c.) and buildings (straight-line depreciation over 33
instead of 25 years). The proposed extensions of the tax base have been considered in the above calcula-
tions.
However, the lowering of the tax rate has not been the only type of reform. During the period 1995-98
France has raised the statutory corporation tax rate by surcharges of 10 p.c. (1995) and 15 p.c. (1997)
from 33.33 p.c. to 41.67 p.c. In addition, the various surcharges on private investment income (including
interest and dividend income) have risen from 4.9 p.c. to 10 p.c. in the same period of time. In 1999 the
corporation tax rate was reduced to 40 p.c. and a further reduction to the former level of 33.33 p.c. is
intended.
EATR level of corporation EATR level of corporation
and shareholder
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Germany 38,16 38,16 38,16 36,84 32,89 25,88 43,83 43,83 40,86 39,52 36,97 27,40
France 37,72 37,72 39,91 39,91 39,91 29,39 45,27 45,27 46,49 48,65 48,63 39,42
UK 21,49 21,49 21,49 19,74 21,05 21,05 26,81 26,81 27,01 24,82 25,81 25,81
Netherlands 23,68 23,68 23,68 23,68 23,68 23,68 38,33 38,33 32,59 31,91 31,85 31,85
USA 32,02 32,02 30,70 30,70 30,70 30,70 35,17 35,17 33,80 33,85 33,79 33,79
Average 30.61 30.61 30.79 30.17 29.64 26.14 37.88 37.88 36.15 35.75 35.41 31.65
Spread 16.67 16.67 18.42 20.17 18.86 9.65 18.46 18.46 19.48 23.83 19.14 13.61
Referring to the structure of the national tax systems two trends have to be emphasized that are impor-
tant for the competitive effects of taxation:
                                                
63 It has to considered, however, that the average tax rate (Hebesatz) of the trade tax on income levied by the German
municipalities has risen over the period 1995-99. Therefore, the calculated decline of the EATR is less than expected.
64 However, the tax rate reduction in 1999 did not effectuate an increase of the EATR at the level of the corporation as
the imputation system was abolished at the same time (see below).
65 For an overview of the tax reforms in earlier years see, for example, CHENNELLS, GRIFFITH (1997), p. 26-30; RIMBAUX,
(1996). Both studies, however, omit non-profit taxes.
66 See ENDRES, DITSCH (1999), p. 89-99, for an overview and comments.
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- Non-profit taxes: Germany has abolished property tax (1997) both for companies and individuals as
well as trade tax on capital (1998). The Netherlands have reduced their property tax rate for individuals
(1998). France has announced to exempt the payroll gradually from the base of the „taxe profession-
nelle“ till the year 2003.
- Corporation tax systems: Since 1997, for qualified shareholders (participation of at least 5 p.c.)67 the
Netherlands apply a shareholder relief system instead of the classical system that is still in force for non-
qualified shareholders. The Dutch shareholder relief provides a reduced income tax rate on dividends of
25 p.c. instead of 60 p.c. on other items of income. Great Britain has abolished its imputation system in
1999 and also introduced a kind of shareholder relief system. Companies no longer have to pay the so-
called advance corporation tax (ACT) which was equal to the tax credit of 20 p.c. From 1999 the tax
credit is reduced to 10 p.c. without giving regard to the corporation tax paid by the company. At the
same time a special upper income tax rate on dividends of 32.5 p.c. (instead of 40 p.c. for ordinary in-
come) was introduced. This reduction together with the reduced tax credit ensures, however, that indi-
vidual shareholders are facing the same post-tax dividend income as before the tax reform.68 Germany
has announced together with the reduction of the corporation tax rate mentioned above to abolish the
full imputation system and introduce a shareholder relief that provides that 50 p.c. of the dividends re-
ceived are exempt from personal income tax.
Altogether, over a period of the last five years including tax reform proposals already announced, in par-
ticular those countries covered by this study which had or still have a high EATR show trends to reduce
their effective tax burdens significantly (e.g. Germany and France). Germany, for example, could improve
its position in the country ranking by one (level of corporation) or two places (overall level). On the other
hand there are only minor reductions of the burdens in those countries where the EATR is already low (e.g.
the UK). From a systematic point of view, the gradual abolition of non-profit taxes and the trend towards
an implementation of shareholder relief corporation tax systems have to emphasized. As a result of the re-
forms the average EATR and the difference between the highest and the lowest EATR both for the level of
the corporation and the overall level have declined (see above table for the data). In spite of the gradual
convergence of the national EATR one cannot conclude, however, that tax distortions of competition be-
came significantly less or even disappeared. Instead, the differences between the national EATR are still
high and the results of the above sensitivity analysis obviously prove the opposite.
4 Summary of conclusions
In the first part of this paper we developed and presented a computer-based model (so-called European
Tax Analyzer) for the international computation and comparison of company tax burdens. The methodol-
ogy follows the forward-looking concepts for the measurement of effective average tax rates (EATR) on
the basis of a model-firm. The EATR is computed for investments generating economic rents (i.e. pure
profits above the market interest rate). In this regard, in contrast to the prevailing approaches for calculating
EATR based on separate and isolate investment projects the model-firm approach offers several advan-
tages:
- Conceptual framework of the model: The model-firm approach allows to consider the relevant mar-
ket conditions in which an investment is generating economic rents (e.g. imperfect market conditions
with different yields inside and outside the company and for different kinds of investments). Moreover,
                                                
67 As our model firm in the base case considers ten shareholders with identical participation (i.e. 10 p.c.), the share-
holder relief applies.
68 See GAMMIE (1998), p. 434-435, for details.
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the tax implications for already existing capital stocks can be considered. Therefore, effective average
tax rates are calculated for more complex and realistic conditions that are relevant for decision making.
At the same time the flexibility of such computer-based model-firms allows the economic assumptions
(e.g. profitability, financing, structure of assets, structure of expenses and dividend policies) to be altered
to suit individual circumstances (e.g. considering different industries).
- Coverage of tax provisions: Due to its flexibility an important advantage of the model-firm approach is
the possibility to include much more relevant and complex provisions of the tax codes. The model-firm
approach accounts not only for all relevant taxes (corporate, personal and non-profit taxes) and the
statutory tax rates but includes various important items of the national tax bases. In particular, many
rules for profit computation including tax electives are covered (e.g. depreciation, valuation of invento-
ries, capitalization of development costs, accounting for pension costs, accounting for provisions for bad
debts, rules for eliminating or mitigating double taxation of (foreign sources) income and loss relief)
which allows a detailed analysis of their tax effects. Furthermore, the model includes the relevant na-
tional provisions for stimulating new investment (e.g. tax credits and grants). Finally, complex tax provi-
sions such as progressive tax rates, tax exempt amounts, and minimum tax provisions that are relevant
for differences between the marginal and the average effective tax burden are covered by the model.
A concrete comparison of the EATR of corporations and their shareholders in five different countries was
carried out in the second part of this paper. This comparison as well as various sensitivity analysis for al-
ternative assumptions of both economic and tax data revealed not only the areas of application of our
European Tax Analyzer but also the wide spread between the EATR in the countries covered by this study.
Based on the comparison of the EATR between Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands, and the USA
the following main conclusions are possible:
- If one can take a medium-sized manufacturing company as typical, the EATR both for corporations and
shareholders is highest in France. This result is above all due to the high level of non-profit taxes. The
USA and in particular Germany, that can be characterized by a high level of direct taxes on profits, are
only in a little more favourable position. In the Netherlands and especially in the UK significantly lower
burdens are imposed.
- This conclusion, however, cannot be generally applied to every situation as there are many options and
planning opportunities which can increase or decrease the EATR in the countries. As examples, the ef-
fects of tax electives and the tax base as a whole, as well as the effects of alternative assumptions con-
cerning relevant economic data like profitability, financing and dividend policy etc. have been shown. In
particular situations, the EATR of Germany, France and the USA can cross. The Netherlands and the
UK, on the other hand, always show the lowest effective tax burdens. This also holds for the EATR of
different industries.
- The differences between the national EATR are related to the individual characteristics of the national
tax systems. The model of the European Tax Analyzer enables to show the user the impact of the cor-
porate tax system, the various profit and non-profit taxes, the tax bases and the tax rates on the EATR.
It could be worked out that the profit taxes, corporation tax systems and tax rates have the highest im-
pact on these differences. Nevertheless, the impact of the tax bases on the EATR cannot be neglected.
Thus harmonizing tax bases as suggested by the „Ruding Committee“ is besides the harmonization of
taxes and tax systems another important condition for lowering the distorting effects of different systems
for company taxation in Europe.
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- For the time series 1995-2000 it could be shown that the differences between the national EATR have
declined a little. In spite of this convergence, however, tax distortions of competition did not become
significantly less.
In summary, we believe that the European Tax Analyzer is a new important instrument for computing and
analyzing the EATR for many complex economic situations taking into account the most relevant provisions
of the national tax codes.
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